Kings Dock - What Really Happened

THE DOCK THAT DIED OF MAIM: THEY SHOOT GIFT HORSES DON’T THEY
By
Mickey Blue Eyes.

“Let justice be done though the heavens fall.”
WILLIAM WATSON (quote c.1559-1603)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
The conclusions and opinions in this essay are of course entirely my own.

But it could not have been written without the prior efforts of everybody involved in the Everton for Kings Dock group – otherwise known as EfKD – of which this writer was a member for twenty enjoyable and absorbing months. Each member contributed professional expertise and/or the commitment of true Evertonians. Some even took career risks. They know who they are.

Special mention must go to Paul Collyer who founded the group. Without him, it is highly likely nothing would have happened. He wanted the vision. We all did, never better expressed than the adopted heartfelt slogan OUR CITY – OUR FUTURE – OUR CLUB.

The following story could have been much longer and contained many more details of a tortuous trail. But the motivation for writing it is to make it as understandable as possible to our fans. Brevity is important if the main issues are to be identified. The internet is a difficult medium to write for and the methods have still to be perfected if attention is to be held for an appreciable period.

We have lived in interesting times. It was one hell of a ride and well worth the saddle sores. The real tragedy for all citizens of our city and Evertonians is that the horse fell with the winning post well in sight. We will now have to settle for something much less.

SOURCES:
During the last twenty months this writer also owes thanks to the following for consenting to interview, sometimes on more than one occasion or by telephone, but in no particular order:

Sir Joe Dwyer – Liverpool Vision.
Rob Burns – English Heritage.
Mike Storey – Leader, Liverpool City Council.
Charlie Parker – Chief of Regeneration, Liverpool City Council.
Joe Anderson – Leader of the Opposition, Liverpool City Council.
Bill Kenwright – Deputy Chairman and Owner, Everton Football Club.
Paul Gregg – Director, Houston Securities and Everton Football Club.
Ian Ross – Head of Corporate Affairs, Everton Football Club.
Steve Lavalle – Project Manager, Houston Securities.
Jim Buxton – Managing Director, Ellis Williams Partnership.
Tariq Tahir – London correspondent, Daily Post.

There were many other sources, much correspondence and many phone calls to and from other individuals and organisations too numerous to list. All were valuable, all have my equal thanks. The result is the aggregate of facts in this essay.

It is surely self-evident many of the above names will not agree with the opinions I express here. Nevertheless, each gave me their valuable time to answer quite pointed questions and engage in lively exchange.

My only regret is that all of it failed to transfer into success at Kings Waterfront. The real irony is that almost everybody wanted it to work.

Pity.

1. PROLOGUE.

In academe there are two prevailing schools of thought on the causes of historical events. Crudely, one is titled “the conspiracy theory,” the other “the cock-up theory.” The terms are self-explanatory. But events are rarely so clear-cut. When a great and respected historian like A.J.P. Taylor gets to the end of his life and says wearily, “Wars happen because they happen,” plainly there is something else wafting through the ether. Us mere mortals are left to make our own assessment. Beware of simplistic explanations.

Also pertinent to this essay is an immutable truth: any worthwhile or prominent building project like Kings Waterfront has its promoters and detractors. This is not necessarily a bad thing since it subjects the proposal to the rationale of sensible critics. But too often it also attracts those on the periphery whose motives have little to do with seeing facts flat on, more to do with their own misconceptions, sour, wilful or otherwise. Subjectivity of design appreciation is almost the least of it. And those of mere soi disant ill-nature, like local hacks, bring nothing to a project. I never complain about this since it is an unavoidable if faintly disgusting constituent of human behaviour. Of necessity genuine creativity must always ignore mediocrity, a position expounded with talent and clarity in Peter Shaffer’s sparkling “Amadeus.” ‘Twas ever thus, ever since the earliest individual effort to avoid the worst of tribalism. Hugo knew exactly what he was doing when he wrote “The Hunchback of Notre Dame.” Similarly, catharsis also has its function but reality and facts are always much more important.

The failure of our involvement in the Kings Waterfront development is a classic example. Like all great building projects (and it WAS a great building project) the saga was surrounded by tacky gossip, propaganda, self-promotion, greed, stupidity, self-delusion, lies and myth. Usually that type of ephemeris nonsense is quickly forgotten when a project is built. Successful brilliant architecture – the greatest of all art forms – has a way of overwhelming and sidelining small mindedness in human behaviour. On the other hand if a project fails, there is never a shortage of available misery-mongers. When that happens commonsense dictates you ignore them and move on to better and more relevant things.

Hence this polemic.

However, I must stress right at the beginning all the facts are still not readily available. New revelations could change the perspective at any time. You will need to exercise your own judgement throughout. Mine is patently obvious at all stages. As always, do your own research, draw your own conclusions.

But beware. If you are a rampant half-educated paranoid seeking a simple solution or a scapegoat you won’t find it here. There is no Guy Fawkes, van der Lubbe, James Earl Ray, Sirhan Sirhan, or Lee Oswald in the story. All there is is a series of badly managed events typical of notoriously fractious English administrative culture. It is a financial Macbeth haunted not by Banquo but by graduates of the Benny Hill Enron Business School. Take my tip, be suspicious of anyone who attempts to pin the failure of this project on one source or one person. Personal attacks make up the spittoon of life and ought to be despatched accordingly.

It is quite possible too there will be ludicrous attempts to claim it was all a publicity stunt. If such claims are made they will be vacuous empty-headed nonsense. They will usually tell you more about the perpetrator than anything else. Some publicity stunt, that. By Everton alone, our future at stake, a spend of £1.5 millions in fees, thousands of man-hours and lots of adverse publicity if and when it failed. As Ciano once said, “Victory has a hundred fathers but defeat is an orphan.”

So use your common sense. As always, the truth is much more prosaic even when relatively complicated.

2. THE ROOTS OF THE PROJECT.

First things first. I viewed the successful HOK-designed project for Houston Securities in its conceptual stage and was immediately in favour, subject to further attention to design, planning details and costs. I still am. So are 85% of our fans through a popular ballot monitored by the Electoral Reform Society. It was an outstanding concept. But scarcely any project is constructed in complete accord with the initial idea. Even a genius like Frank Lloyd Wright altered aspects of his masterpiece Falling Water during construction. Like all great artists he knew too how true creativity is subject to the envy and fractious meddling of dilettantes, charlatans, mediocrities or greed. This is why Kings Waterfront was always going to be fluid, and of course that’s what happened, and not only to the basic concept. Add in the claque of clients, funders, publicity hungry politicians, prevailing socio-economic culture, Old Uncle Tom Cobleigh an’ all and it can become a nightmare. Kings Waterfront was just such a theoretical nightmare made manifest.

After all, you have before you the prime examples of Wembley, the Millenium Dome, Sheffield’s Student Games, England’s failed World Cup bid and Picketts Lock. There is a common theme. Balanced against this is the tremendous success in nearby Manchester of the Commonwealth Games and the new Commonwealth Stadium. In short, we can do it really well in this country if we try. Sadly, too often we fail and fail badly. We have too many incompetents, too many moaners and allow too much vested self-interest or fear of failure to overwhelm common sense. At times the system is almost pitted against good will and ability in favour of jobsworths, spivs and useless sentimentality. English Romanticism, once a powerful factor in our culture, is long dead. Instead, now we have a host of cheap barrow boys and second rate politicians as the nomenklatura. Small wonder this is a country almost under siege from kitsch wielding peons whose chief idea of creativity is the sale of badly designed t-shirts, burger-flipping or a cheap line in so-called “street cred.”

Of much more importance, the roots of the Kings Waterfront project lie in our beloved city’s economic decline and the demise of the entire length of the old docks system caused by containerisation of sea-borne freight. Like every other old industrial port city in the world we were faced with a near desperate need to redevelop obsolescent waterfront areas. All of this was set against a background of an establishment swing toward extreme right-wing policies and other factors which left most provincial industrial cities bereft of suitable funds for regeneration. Since this is a polemic and not an academic essay you’ll have to do your own research into those details too.

Under the previous system local planning was almost entirely the legal responsibility of local government. But over the years new policies scattered a lot of this into a plethora of government agencies, semi-government agencies or corporations, local authorities and regeneration companies. (Liverpool Vision was the first government-initiated urban regeneration company in the country.) Co-ordination was and is frequently staccato and complicated, thus proving that a camel is a horse designed by committee. Typically, regeneration of our city’s waterfront fell easily between every available stool. Add into this the undeniable if unpalatable fact that this is a poor city, and that means an undignified scramble for public or private funds by vested interests, and you can see where we were headed almost from the beginning.

Unlike Manchester our city never developed a reasonable consensus for systematic practical transformation of its decaying city centre, let alone the inner dormitory areas. While Manchester got things done, however little, however imperfectly, our city suppurated. We are only now beginning to shake off the malaise and even then only with the first fragile staggering of a foal.

This almost prevented Joe Dwyer from taking up the part-time post of chairman of Liverpool Vision when first offered to him by government minister Richard Caborne. Dwyer, a son of the city, and a sometime pinkies fan to boot, knew its disparate power structure and equally desperate financial condition and wasn’t inclined to waste too much of his time tilting at windmills. Nevertheless, he took the post. As a former chief of Wimpey Homes it was hoped his construction and property expertise and hard-nosed professionalism would help get things done. He makes little secret of his impatience with local politicking and considers himself an enabler, a creator of catalytic business opportunities to aid regeneration. In short, given prevailing establishment policies, the perfect chairman for the country’s first government created urban regeneration company. Joe is always sure to point out though that he isn’t a government employee and Liverpool Vision is NOT (horror!) a quango. His role, for good or ill, has been absolutely pivotal.

In July 2000 Liverpool Vision accordingly produced a comprehensive planning document with timeline titled “Strategic Regeneration Framework.” This was produced by American planning and architectural consultants, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill Inc. In turn, this was meant to complement Liverpool City Council’s own planning document “Unitary Development Plan,” first draft dated November 2000, and at the time of writing yet to be finalised. Then you can add in the process of European Community funding via Objective One status.

(Yes, I know your head is reeling with bureaucracy already. I won’t bother you with further complications. I describe this to give you but a taste of the form-filling Byzantine organisation of this and other projects. If you don’t grasp the implications of this then you’re going to have trouble with the remainder of this essay let alone my opinions and conclusions. In which case, read no further. It will be too complicated for you.)

Part of the complementary planning work was to designate uses for all areas of the city, including the waterfront. The area south of the Pierhead and Albert Dock was titled “Kings Waterfront.” The Liverpool Vision document designated the site for an “Arena and Sports Facility” in its Appraisal of Zone 1 (Waterfront). The designation is described in further detail throughout the remainder of the document. Liverpool City Council has implicitly accepted the Liverpool Vision proposals and has not contested the substance of them. Therefore the basic use and suitability of the site was long ago established. Furthermore, all the planning proposals (including Kings Waterfront) are holistically considered, which means they are tied into, for instance, long term traffic planning.

All of this has been in the public domain since its inception.

3. THE EVERTON STADIUM CONUNDRUM.

At the same time Everton Football Club had long expressed two options: (a) relocate to a new stadium or (b) redevelop Goodison Park within the existing site “footprint.” This policy survived two changes of club ownership.

The club briefly examined about twelve sites in pursuit of option (a) but never settled on any of them. Option (b) is discounted primarily due to modern stadia spatial requirements applied to the narrow width and wedge shape of the existing plot. The site diminishes from Gwladys Street toward the Stanley Park end. If you have problems visualising this, go to http://www1.getmapping.com/home.asp, go to the “I Want” search box, top right, and insert the postcode L4 4EL. Then click on “Everton Football Club.” This will bring up an aerial photo of the area.

To put it crudely, whichever way you try to adjust the basic layout plan you encounter severe design limitations due to lack of site width. This particularly affects detail design of mass volume circulation spaces. Therefore, we cannot obtain a first-class, proportionate iconic stadium of sufficient capacity within the existing “footprint,” even if the plan is made parallel with Goodison Road. A stadium is possible but it could never be of the superior type most Evertonians want. Once again, beware of simplistic or naive one- or even two-dimensional solutions. Phased construction during use would be a nightmare too since it reduces capacity for up to half a decade (and thus reduces gate takings) and leaves the stadium as little more than a building site for the duration. This would not be the action of a first-class club seriously intent on regaining its former position in the game. But it would be the action of a club bereft of imagination, determination and ambition. It may yet be the club’s fate.

If you want a built example of how site restrictions can adversely affect stadium design and appearance you need look no further than Newcastle and lopsided St. James Park. Even that project required additional land before it could be developed. The result is an unattractive, asymmetrical response where mere structural engineering has replaced architectural design as priority. Two sides of the ground are disproportionate to accommodate the required capacity. This is what would happen on the existing Goodison site, except it would lead to oversized stands behind each goal. If not oversized, the total capacity is reduced accordingly. In which case, almost the whole raison d’etre of development is lost. There is not much gain in building for a relatively small increase in capacity.

Always double-check any claim of new capacity. Up to the time of writing almost every claim of capacity is for nominal not actual capacity. The latter is usually lower, which is probably why the pinkies increased their proposed new stadium capacity from 55 to 60,000.

In our case Goodison Park has become a four sided architectural mélange since 1970 with only vague unity of form via the roof-line and a faint similarity between the Bullens Road and Gwladys Street stands. The Goodison Road and Park End stands are an ugly mish-mash which accurately reflects site design difficulties. I have yet to meet any fan who likes either structure or the current advert-smothered part-conversion of the other two stands. The idea that this imparts “atmosphere” is absurd. Great games and players create atmosphere generated by fans, not stadia. Whoever heard of an empty stadium generating atmosphere? A new structure can help magnify sights and sounds through improved form and acoustics, particularly roof form, nothing more. All-seater stadia are just as effective if designed for that purpose. If standing terraces generate more atmosphere – which they don’t – why is every lower division ground (like Shrewsbury’s for instance) not buzzing every week?

So if we were to stay at the same location in Walton there could be only one realistic but untidy solution and that is an additional land-take for new construction and turning of a new stadium through ninety degrees. Realistically, the land-take would have to include the church at the corner of Gwladys Street, as well as the school, all the housing and the small business at the corner of Walton Lane. Even then, what’s the point? A new stadium would no longer be the Goodison Park we knew and loved in its long gone heyday over thirty years ago. Time passes. You move on. Men and women live and die. New lives come into being. Genuinely sensitive architecture and planning reflects this. Some of the most brutal and compromised architecture is executed on behalf of ill-informed primitives in search of a faded memory.

In truth even a land-take acquisition is a remnant of incoherent sentiment for part of a site with no resemblance to the original, all of it in a decayed inner city area. In which case common sense dictates we should move to a better location, be it the Kings Waterfront or any other appropriate site. Nostalgia may be comfortable in a dandruff-and-Guinness halitosis sort of way but it doesn’t much help the club’s future. Leave rotten teeth in place long enough and they fall out. Nor would a cheap Pride Park stadium in the same restricted location be of much use. No, there is no persuasive argument for staying in Walton. All that’s left is nostalgic hallucination. The club’s founders had no such illusion when they relocated several times. Since then, one move in a hundred years isn’t exactly itinerant revolution a la Ché Guevara.

In any event Liverpool City Council have already expressed strong reservations for proposals on the existing site (rebuild or new) on justifiable general planning grounds, and it is highly likely it would be faced with even stiffer opposition from local residents in any land-take. A change of mind is possible but not likely. This plus detailed planning aspects would add yet more years to the programme. Few locals have forgotten the stoic example of the elderly sisters who preserved their homes and rightly held up construction of a new stand at Anfield for years. Anfield is yet another ground of failed imagination suffocated by site boundaries and sickly nostalgia.

For Evertonians, the ultimate spectre, always possible, would be the disaster of staying exactly as we are with no money to do anything at all while the rest of football gets on sensibly with modernisation fit for the new millennium. Staying moribund surely doesn’t bear thinking about. We need a flow of bright and ambitious imagination to take us forward. Slow your blood flow and you end up with shrivelled arteries. In which case you deserve all you get. There has never been a time when worthwhile progress was anything less than fiercely driven. For example, Haussman’s beautiful Paris boulevards were created with one eye on discouraging revolution. As another example, most of our city’s wonderful architecture was created by single-minded determinism and self-confidence. In comparison everything else is the kind of half-arsed, weak-kneed, well-meaning waffle you get at an average Rotary Club meeting.

So for once in our city’s modern history, city-centre planning and the desire of some of its major institutions coincided. Unfortunately, like so much in the project, details of the beginnings of the actual fusion process are not known. It is not clear who met who or when or when the club first became interested in the new opportunity. If these facts ever become known it may explain much of what followed.

Dovetailing perfectly, our city needed a major community-based multi-purpose arena to reinforce its City of Culture 2008 bid and our club needed a new stadium. The waterfront location, one of the most famous and instantly recognised in the world, was undeniably the best place by far for the two to come together. For too long the city and its citizens have been physically separated from its greatest amenity, the river. Potentially it was a quantum leap to a marriage made in heaven.

But what was the dowry and who was going to pay it?

4. THE PROCESS AND THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES.

At the Kings Waterfront the next step in early 2001 was to actually develop the site and fulfil the promise of the planning proposals. In due course Liverpool Vision invited development bids for the site. All the competitors had to take account of planning requirements described above. Some of the bidders complained the terms of reference were altered during the bid process. In July 2001 the bidding process was won by Houston Securities, a firm majority-owned by the family of Paul Gregg, also one of the majority-owners of Everton Football Club. Houston achieved “preferred bidder status.” The winning scheme included a multi-purpose stadium/arena, hotel, residential and other commercial uses. From the beginning Everton were designated the pivotal project role of anchor tenant of the stadium/arena. The project could not proceed without the club’s involvement. Thus, there must have been prior agreement between Houston Securities, Everton Football Club and other interested parties. So much is obvious.

But how did Houston Securities get involved in the first place? According to an article in the magazine ”North West Business Insider,” March 2002 issue (http://www.newsco.co.uk/northwest/archive/2002/story/story280.html) the company had no track record in projects of this kind and had minimal assets. Questions arise from this article:

· How did they win the project with such a background?
· What was the full content of their alleged preliminary discussions?
· What steps were taken by Liverpool Vision to ensure that not only Houston Securities were qualified to make the bid but that they could deliver the final product?
· What steps were taken by the reviewing agency to monitor progress on a regular basis?
· What formal milestones were set by Liverpool Vision and other members of the consortium?
· Who decided and agreed the role and function of Everton Football Club in the project?
· What formal communication was there between Houston Securities and the board of directors at Everton?
· How did the Everton directors monitor the project?
· Was the programme made clear to everybody, especially where it impacted on the city’s bid for City of Culture 2008?

To secure the project Houston Securities of the private sector formed a consortium with the public sector represented by North West Development Agency, English Partnerships (who own the site) and Liverpool City Council. More questions:

· Where did the idea originate for this consortium?
· Who took the initiative?
· How were the percentage shares decided and on what basis?
· Why were the business plans not made public? After all, three members of the consortium were from the public sector and using public money.

Parallel with this came the financial/funding model. Yet another question:

· Where did this originate?

Eventually, in keeping with establishment policies, like them or not, the final model was a public-private investment on a 50-50 basis. Up to that final point the percentages varied to make sure it complied with requirements for schemes including European Objective One capital. It is very easy to ask why it wasn’t ALL private money………………………but in such a poor city where was the overall total estimated cost of £365 million to come from? Fact, our city was and is in a terribly vulnerable position when it comes to major projects. Those acquainted with the administrative débacles at Exchange Buildings and Chavasse Park will need no further briefing.

The last forty years of our local history is riddled with failed grandiose private development schemes or efforts. The truth is it was either public-private or it was public or it was nothing at all. It was this simple fact of life which flattened virtually any political opposition, which wasn’t much anyway. It was the public-private route Manchester was also forced to take for the Commonwealth Games – but they made an outstanding success of it. For Kings Waterfront to work, the model demanded similar committed intensity, organisation, professionalism and trust from all partners. Repeat, ALL PARTNERS. Anything less and it would fall like a pack of cards. And fall it did, and to the detriment of everybody involved. For our city the loss is nothing short of tragic. Anybody who tries to pin the blame on one person, tempting in its simplicity as it is, has little idea of the history of the project or how these things work.

Originally the overall estimated construction cost of the entire development was reported at approximately £365 millions. This included the stadium/arena at an estimated £150 millions, a variable figure depending on which source you use. Some sources claim it is £155 millions. As confirmed to me by Mike Storey, Leader of Liverpool City Council on 7th October 2002, the stadium/arena construction cost was to be met roughly as follows:
(a) European Objective One funding - £35 millions.
(b) Houston Securities - £30 millions.
(c) English Partnerships - £25 millions.
(d) North West Development Agency - £10 millions.
(e) Liverpool City Council - £10 millions.
(f) Development receipts from non-arena development - £40 millions.
Total - £150 millions.
Though mildly complex, this method worked if everybody did their job and did it with even reasonable competence. It was perfectly deliverable. All consortia work in similar fashion. The real key was ALWAYS the development receipts because this meant Houston Securities had to obtain an additional private development partner to fund non-stadium/arena elements. It appears there was an internal agreement that Everton would eventually provide the Houston Securities £30 millions with Paul Gregg providing the initial guarantee for that amount. Despite a squabble over the details of this £30 millions (including the sale of Goodison Park) it was never really an issue capable of halting the project.
But it needs to be said good and loud that public perception was not helped by opacity surrounding the scheme, or by apparent conflict of interests inherent in some individuals within the consortium. The public have been kept in twilight, if not full dark, since the whole thing got off the ground. Information was either vague or late when it appeared. This was almost inevitable given the nature of the process previously described.

As an example, this writer e-mailed the sports editor of a local newspaper to ask for support for the project and received the answer to, “…………leave it to the powers that be”! Small wonder there were valid doubts and these were fully exploited by enemies of the project and petty personal enemies of some of the participants. In short, it was a mess from the beginning and it got worse as time wore on. It was small consolation when the same newspaper eventually committed itself to support of the scheme.

And time DID wear on. And on. And on. Nothing of any real substance was heard between the official announcement of Houston Securities winning the project in July 2001 and a stadium construction-financing proposal by Paul Gregg in October 2002, a period of fifteen months. All we heard were perfunctory announcements of “due diligence” exercises or planning delays. These analyses have never been made public. The planning application was postponed no fewer than four times during that time. The final postponement in late 2002 finally set alarm bells ringing. Simple programme arithmetic showed the projected final completion date would be compromised if it delayed any further. Finally, Houston Securities lost “preferred bidder” status in December 2002, seventeen months after winning the bid. Yet more questions:

· What caused this delay?
· What steps did each member of the consortium and Liverpool Vision take to monitor and correct the situation as it developed?
· Why did they allow the programme to meander?

If you want weasel words from Liverpool Vision, here they are:

http://www.liverpoolvision.co.uk/documents/pressreleases/kingspr1.pdf

5. ACTIONS WITHIN THE CONSORTIUM AND BY LIVERPOOL VISION.

It should be recalled the bid was won by Houston Securities, not Everton Football Club. The difference is important.

An academic analysis of this project would surely concentrate on the key role of Paul Gregg and how he communicated with the consortium, Everton Football Club and Liverpool Vision. Such an analysis would also concern itself with the basis of the financial/funding model and the concept design, and how both evolved. Also, according to various reports, Everton were due to receive revenue from stadium/arena non-football events plus revenue from the rest of the development. The precise nature and share of projected revenues has never been made public, nor have any of the business plans. However, it can be said safely that on the face of it, in the interests of the club, the Everton directors would have been irresponsible to ignore the opportunity to relocate to Kings Waterfront, one of the most instantly recognised sites in the world.

Gregg is a curious figure in all of this. So is his relationship with deputy chairman Bill Kenwright. Together they are majority owners of the club. Gregg readily concedes he knows nothing about football, that he became part-owner at the invitation of Kenwright, a long-time colleague in promoting show business events and personalities. This followed Gregg’s offer to participate in the take over. He had just made a substantial profit on selling his share in international entertainments group SFX, now Clear Channel. He has never explained why he bought into the club during the nadir of its playing fortunes and at a time when it was obvious there could be no quick return on capital. He said the Kings Waterfront project never even entered his calculations until months after he bought his share. Since then, there appears to have been a board-room schism of major proportions. And still more questions:

· Why, then, did Paul Gregg buy in to the club?
· How did he expect to get a return on capital?
· Put bluntly, what was in it for him?
· With the failure of Kings Dock, what is his future at the club?

Eventually, fifteen long months after winning preferred bidder status, Gregg made a back-of-envelope presentation to the club’s board of directors on the afternoon of the club’s annual general meeting on 31st October 2002. This concerned Everton’s share of construction costs for the stadium/arena, a so-called “reverse mortgage” scheme where the club borrowed £30 millions from sources never publicly named but only if the club made over its revenues from the entire development. Once again it is unclear why it took such a long time to produce. With interest, the total to be repaid was reported in the region of £70 millions over about ten years. The rest of the board rejected it by a vote of 5 to 1. And so did most of the fans. Gregg was on his own.

· Is he now an isolated figure in the board-room?
· If so, was it his actions alone which got him into that position?

But that is the way it was from the start of the project. My information is that the rest of the consortium and Liverpool Vision wanted to deal only with Gregg from the beginning. Apparently the project would not have proceeded without this arrangement. Understandably this was on the basis that Everton Football Club and its executives had absolutely no expertise in a property deal of this magnitude. The questions are relentless:

· Given Houston Securities sparse background, why was it assumed that company was any better?
· Why Paul Gregg in particular, and who made the decision to deal only with him?
· Which individuals at Liverpool Vision and the consortium partners approved this line of action?
· Why did Liverpool Vision not check if Gregg was indeed communicating everything necessary to Everton Football Club?
· Why did it take Gregg fifteen months to come up with an unacceptable financial package?

And since Paul Gregg and Houston Securities were “up front” surely it can only have been they who made the original guarantee of £30 millions toward the construction cost of the stadium. Yet he claimed in his interview with me that all he said was he “would stand behind Everton,” whatever that means. If Liverpool Vision and the rest of the consortium allowed Houston Securities to go ahead without this guarantee then there are some obvious questions to be directed there too. There are important questions about the guarantee, if it even existed:

· If obtained, what form did the guarantee take?
· If NOT obtained, how could the project proceed? Who allowed it to proceed in such unacceptable circumstances?
· Why was the guarantee not in the form of an irrevocable bond or similar?
· Did the other consortium members and Liverpool Vision ask to see a formal guarantee at any time? If yes, when?
· Why did the Everton board of directors also not ask to see a formal guarantee during that same period?
· Why did the Everton directors apparently leave Gregg on his own for so long?
· Does this not make Paul Gregg’s position now untenable?
· Does it not place large question marks against the abilities and actions of the entire board of directors and its Chief Executive?

When Liverpool Vision got round to forcing the issue, Gregg made it clear he had no intention of signing a cheque for £30 millions. He said he “……would be mad……” to do so.

· In which case, why did he (as Houston Securities) get involved in the project in the first place? Surely the invoice was always going to fall due?

But Gregg’s denial meant Everton Football Club (without Houston Securities) now had to fill the vacuum at relatively short notice. More to the point, with Bill Kenwright now up front as Gregg went off the radar screen, they still had to find private partners for design and construction of non-stadium developments. But why were the rest of the consortium seemingly mere bystanders on the question of other private partners? After all, they were committing public money to the enterprise.

There are key questions too in the closing stages of the project:

· Houston Securities won “preferred bidder” status in July 2001 and lost it in December 2002, a period of seventeen months. Everton Football Club then assumed lead developer role and claim they had “a gentleman’s agreement” to complete financial arrangements by 31st March. If true, why was this period effectively terminated by Liverpool Vision during the week 21st-28th February 2003? (See below) What possible difference could four weeks make in the overall scheme of things?
· At what date did Liverpool Vision decide to go with an alternative development?
· When did Liverpool Vision reach basic agreement concerning an alternative development?
· Why was the site not opened to competitive bids again?
· Why were the public sector partners frozen like rabbits in the headlights?
· Which public sector partner “pulled the plug” before the alleged final date of 31st March? How and why was this decision reached?
· Was it Bryan Gray of North West Development Agency, also former chairman of Preston North End? If so, why did HE take the first step?
· If the alternative arena development goes ahead will Clear Channel still be involved in promoting events there? Which other events promoters will be involved? Que bono?

Outside the consortium, minor local political opposition came from three Labour councillors in the Abercromby ward, messrs. Anderson, Munby and Grant. Anderson, who is a committed Evertonian, later became leader of the Labour group on the City Council. But this had no real affect on the progress of the project. When I interviewed him he showed a remarkably crude lack of knowledge of how such schemes are designed. As an example, at one point he queried how emergency services were going to have access and egress – a basic design function and statutory requirement for any similar project which will go on any site anywhere. Moreover, he made it clear he would not support the scheme unless it had a preponderance of private funding, an extraordinary position for a Labour councillor. His suggestions for alternative sites were Leeds Street and Edge Lane, two brown field locations which imply even more planning problems, land reclamation and infrastructure costs, as does almost any other inland site within the city boundaries. Kings Waterfront is a clear site. His opposition appeared to owe more to short term political ward opportunism than any thought-through intellectual consideration. His main observation, never justified, was merely that the project was “not deliverable.” This is not a valid argument. It is mere rhetoric unsupported by rationale. Nevertheless, Anderson raised some important and quite justified questions, some of which are repeated in this essay. I believe Joe Anderson simply made the wrong judgement based on inadequate knowledge. His two cohorts probably merely followed his example. Another example of a different type of politicking was the Janus-faced approach of Peter Kilfoyle, MP for Walton, in his spurious early day motion 923 in the House of Commons.

Political support for the project came from Mike Storey, leader of the City Council, board member of Liverpool Vision and also board member of consortium partner North West Development Agency. The site is in the constituency of Labour MP Louise Ellmann and she also gave the project her full support. In fact the project received generous political support right across party lines in the Merseyside region, an automatic requirement if the project was to proceed in the proposed format. It would not have gone far without it.

According to the aforementioned article in “North West Business Insider” the stadium/arena idea originated with City Council Leader Mike Storey and CEO David Henshaw. If this is true, then their actions should surely be examined for competence and motivation in as much detail as the rest of the consortium, especially where they overlap.

But despite the unanswered questions, there can be little doubt of the initial good will of the public sector partners and their widespread support for the project. The main query must surely be directed against their method of inception and monitoring progress, not against their commitment. Failure was not in their interests any more than it was in the interests of Everton Football Club. Mike Storey even had himself pictured in the local press heading a football after openly declaring his support. Bill Kenwright and some of the directors got full newspaper publicity when they visited European stadia similar to the Houston Securities proposal. The combined impetus and good will should have made it unstoppable.

But still it failed. So what REALLY went wrong?

6. THE FINAL STAGE.

As noted above, the project moved into its final stage after 31st December 2002 when Houston Securities lost its status as “preferred bidder.”

At that point Liverpool Vision assured Everton Football Club they would have until 31st March 2003 to make their final proposal, though any work they undertook would be entirely at their own risk. Given previous events this was acceptable, fair even.

But having given that assurance neither they nor any of the other consortium partners could avoid criticism for their subsequent actions. For on 21st and 28th February Liverpool Vision and Mike Storey of Liverpool City Council then announced they weren’t going to wait until 31st March and were proceeding willy-nilly with an alternative. This was surely just another lesson in how not to manage a large project, yet more action positioning in advance of adverse reaction. Having failed to monitor the project properly in full public view, now they appeared intent on distancing themselves from any responsibility for its failure. To this writer at least they appeared to be trying to have it both ways. The current term is “spin doctoring.”

Everybody knows the tiresome symptoms by now. One of them is to plant a story in the local rag, in this case – what else – the grub sheet Daily Post. In the issue of 1st April – how appropriate for this project! – “a senior council source” was quoted: “………it is Everton trying to save the moral high ground.” Presumably this was one of the “senior council” members or employees who agreed to the moral high ground 31st March date in the first place. Quite apart from the contempt I feel for anyone who deals in this fashion I have automatic mistrust for anyone with or without standard PR training who uses wooden and meaningless terms like “moral high ground.” So the “senior council source” was just another jobsworth in reaction mode. It was probably someone looking for an important addition to their CV before moving on – and now with egg all over his/her incapable face.

Also typically, again according to the local press, Liverpool Vision moved office on the last day open for delivery of the final proposal. Which meant they missed an important fax from the club on the final submittal date. Given the previous mess, you could have written the script. It was a herd of Devon Lochs queuing up to fall over each other to fall over a blade of grass a hundred metres from the winning post. It was the only thing they project managed correctly.

And the same local press also quoted a similar source as saying, “Kenwright…………is trying to wriggle off the hook.”

Oh.

What “hook” would that be? One set by some jumped up local authority clerk more intent on rescuing his/her own reputation than dealing like a genuine professional with the best interests of the city at heart? But did Kenwright finally see a looming PR trap and deal out in kind? If the latter is true, and the project was already lost, then I have little doubt a majority of Evertonians would be on Kenwright’s side, not the “senior council source.” All of which means there is now no reason for that source to be trusted in any future negotiations with the club. Anybody who conducts him/herself in such fashion should be dismissed out of hand.

Even more typical of events in the closing weeks there was an alleged leak from Mike Storey via the internet that Everton could “…………expect some good news in May or June.” Again, use your common sense. Why should this leak be made in the run-up to the formal announcement of failure at Kings Dock? Que bono? Who was playing political football with our future?

7. CONCLUSIONS.

Still, given the above details, short shrift should be given to the absurd notion that the City Council as a matter of policy “have it in for Everton.” This is paranoid nonsense mostly based on a previous justifiable Council rejection of a badly conceived outline proposal for taking part of Stanley Park, put forward during the years of Peter Johnson’s unlamented ownership. It is probably also based on ill-informed reaction to justified preliminary Council planning restrictions on redevelopment of the Goodison Park stadium. Sure, one or two chauvinist councillors will be unable to overcome their worst football tribal chauvinist instincts, but nowhere in sufficient numbers to make a real difference. There’s too much at stake for the city and, in their case, too many votes to risk. Angry and organised Evertonians would destroy them at the polls. Joe Anderson even ruefully told me he thought he would get the blame if the project failed, something which would devastate his party’s 33,000 total vote in local elections. Joe can rest easy. It isn’t his fault and most sensible people know it. He was mostly peripheral to events even when he gained a seat on the board of Liverpool Vision – where he told me he scrupulously avoided voting when Kings Waterfront was discussed.

For all that the public sector partners of the consortium and Liverpool Vision failed dismally to deliver their share of project management. As the above questions demonstrate, any of them could have instilled discipline into the process at any time. All they had to do was publicly ask the same questions listed here. Their failure is as palpable as anyone else’s. They bear a relative proportion of the blame.

They can’t have it two ways…………on the one hand deliberately opt to deal only with Paul Gregg and then try to blame Everton Football Club when that approach doesn’t work.

The fact remains Liverpool Vision also failed in its self-styled primary function as an “enabling agency.” It proceeded in secrecy for the most part and failed to set publicly measurable milestones. The problems were quantifiable and capable of solution in a more effective system. Had they been more rigorous or professional in their approach the whole matter could have been terminated or solved much earlier. Their performance clearly demonstrates the perils of leaving this vital function to a private company. Transparency is required, not opacity. In such an important project nobody should be able to hide behind the smoke screen of “commercial confidence,” in this case surely a euphemism for something-to-hide.

The public sector partners were virtually useless in the interim and later stages despite their initial support of the project. They acted like Pontius Pilate, not active partners in a consortium. They appear to have thought that once they co-ordinated the system process in their formal areas of activity then that was all they had to do. If true, it demonstrates appalling business ignorance and lack of professional management abilities. Standing in the background wringing your hands is not constructive activity, nor is the jobsworth attitude of blaming someone else when things go awry. Where English Partnerships, the North West Development Agency and Liverpool City Council are concerned it is obvious old bureaucratic attitudes die hard. In the end this probably helped to kill the project too, perhaps aided by a considerable loss of nerve or late second thoughts.

In the City Council’s case failure of the project also gives them a potential convenient scapegoat for possible loss of the City of Culture 2008 bid. Given the failures described above any such attempt should receive the contempt it would deserve.

Conversely, in my opinion even a cursory examination shows the performances of the Everton board of directors and its CEO Michael Dunford have been unacceptable to our fans. We had a right to expect more. Instead it has been a catalogue of secretive ham-fisted incompetence and apparent petty factionalism at least on a par with anything the rest of the consortium had to offer. They seemingly failed in the most important areas of all, monitoring and control of Houston Securities and liasing with other members of the consortium. This was never better demonstrated than the October board-room split over the “reverse mortgage” proposal. Paul Gregg insisted to me publicly the board were kept fully informed at every stage as that proposal developed and that it was no surprise to them. I have no idea whether this is correct or not. Whatever, at a time when they should have behaved with unity and competence they seem to have failed on every worthwhile count.

From outside it is possible to guess there were perhaps three factions on the board in this issue. One was Paul Gregg and his self-interests, the second Bill Kenwright too often isolated and distracted in London, and the third a mix of Philip Carter-Jon Woods-Arthur Abercromby-Keith Tamlin. Possibly Dunford wavered between all three factions. If indeed there was self-interest within the board, and the culprits did not act in the best interests of the club, then they have shown themselves to be irresponsible at the minimum. In a vigorous corporate system with active shareholders their positions would be in immediate question. There would also be a huge question mark against their personal loyalty to Bill Kenwright. As anyone with military experience knows, true loyalty is a priceless asset but rarely found. In fact boardroom leaks abounded and they point to only two directors, but likely it was only one.

The result was a steady drip of negativity suiting only the perpetrator(s) and inevitable petty low-level personal enemies of some of the board and the very concept of the project. Two-faced slyness is an ugly and contemptible trait, the kind you don’t want with you in a trench. Still, even if true, of itself this was not enough to cause the project to fall. It was merely one of the dominoes.

Kenwright’s position appears to have been compromised right from the start, with the other supposed two factions pulling at each end and he unwilling or unable to assert himself. It was certainly possible for Gregg to go his own way if – initially at least – he was the only one dealing with Liverpool Vision and the rest of the consortium. There cannot be a sane fan who doubts Bill Kenwright’s hard work, love and devotion for the club. He has after all put a large part of his personal fortune on the line in buying his share of ownership. Equally, it is fair to ask just how distracted he became by his other business problems and by residence in London. This would leave him open to manipulation by the other factions, if they existed. Even then, had he moved decisively and early he could easily have crushed internal opposition to the project. He certainly had enough warnings. He has only himself to blame.

To this fan it looks possible that Bill Kenwright was lined up in the later stages to take a fall and he walked right into it with his eyes wide shut. I have no doubts at all he was very badly advised almost from the beginning and didn’t have the necessary experience, training or time to overcome the obstacles. In the past he has also made it clear he wished to avoid visceral internal disagreement in order to preserve at least a public face of unity. Alas, this isn’t the way the real world works. Property deals aren’t put together the same way as theatre productions. Also, he really should have known that any group will almost always contain at least one who can’t be trusted, who either wants to be all things to all men or who uses information for his own sly purposes or greed. Therefore it’s a fairly safe bet someone in the supposed third faction took full advantage of the situation.

If the third faction existed at all it is a signal question as to what was its real intention and who were its members. At the last Annual General Meeting it was starkly noticeable that Woods, Abercromby, Tamlin and CEO Dunford said nothing while Kenwright, Gregg and Carter (eventually) took questions on the Kings Waterfront. This on arguably the most important single issue in the history of Everton Football Club. Ludicrously, at one stage Carter appeared to try to move on without even discussing the issue. I know of at least one senior executive who probably aligned himself with the supposed third faction, maybe unconsciously. And probably he did it by directing its wishes into the media where they could cause some damage or by delaying actions long enough to have the same affect. The story is as old as the hills. That’s the real tragedy in all of this, the weakness of incapable men throughout the consortium.

But the board had committed itself collectively and publicly to the project from the beginning, so they must stand or fall collectively together with the Chief Executive. As previously stated, apparently consultants fees alone came to about £1.5 millions. In which case they all have to bear their share of responsibility for loss of that expenditure. Not one of them escapes criticism. They had twenty months to get it right. Paul Gregg delivered his “reverse mortgage” proposal only after fifteen months elapsed. They all have some serious explaining to do.

· So what were they ACTUALLY DOING for fifteen months?
· Did they work to a unified plan or not?
· What function did each perform?
· How on earth could they (according to Gregg himself) allow Paul Gregg to even proceed with a “reverse mortgage” scheme they surely knew was unacceptable in principle? Remember, this concerned EFC’s £30 millions share of the stadium construction costs, NOT the additional funding required for non-stadium development receipts.
· Did any of them have a personal agenda which differed from the publicly stated club position?

All of this once again demonstrates how great projects are subject to a variety of external factors. The factors need not necessarily be opposed – most of the planning, technical and European funding arguments against Kings Waterfront are easily defeated – but if they are incompetent or filled with uninformed half-truths or, worse, sabotage, they can delay progress. Outright deception will usually delay things too since there is a time consuming need to cover up. Where the process is not crystal clear it is usually because the waters have been muddied. At each stage you have to ask que bono? – who benefits? – who benefited from a drawn out process which in the end stretched to twenty long months?

And, to repeat, and just as important:

What were Liverpool Vision and the other consortium members doing to monitor and control the situation and discharge their public duties? How much public money did THEY expend? Which individuals authorised the expenditure? Did they comply with the Nolan Principles of Public Life?

Which brings me back neatly to square one. With the examples of Wembley, the Millenium Dome, Pickett’s Lock and England’s failed bid for the World Cup staring us in the face, does not Kings Waterfront line up with those unhappy precedents? In my view, yes it does, even taking into account differences of detail.

In the end Kings Waterfront failed because those charged with its delivery – that is, Liverpool Vision, Liverpool City Council, North West Development Agency, Houston Securities/Everton Football Club, and English Partnerships – didn’t discharge their responsibilities with enough co-ordinated determination. There appear to have been few inbuilt timely checks and balances and none of the consortium appeared capable of breaking out of the loop of mediocre project management. For whatever reason, they simply left too much to each other and baulked at facing the truth. Then they distanced themselves to avoid their share of responsibility.

It is quite possible too the public sector lost its collective nerve or might even have pulled the plug at the last moment for a more profitable alternative. There may be other reasons.

However complicated the details and activities, given the necessary technical and professional expertise, good project management isn’t really that difficult. Mistakes are inevitable but if you keep on top of the job these should be reduced to a manageable number. In a consortium of this type all it took was one or two empowered and competent persons to ask the right questions at the right time and the alarm bells would have gone off early enough. Instead, seventeen vital months were lost, and then so was the project. They all snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Every member of the consortium is to blame, no exceptions.

This was never better exampled than the dubious claim that the estimated cost of the stadium/arena rose by about £30 millions above its original estimated total. There has never been any public explanation of how that figure was arrived at. Nor has there been any expression of an allowance for inflation in the original estimate. Nevertheless, £30-odd millions was the figure given to Bill Kenwright and the one he proceeded with during the last few months of the project.

Think about that for a minute. Supposedly without change of specification, allegedly the estimated cost rose by about TWENTY PERCENT in the course of seventeen months. Of course this is a rank absurdity. Inflation (sometimes titled “escalation” and excluding general inflation) in UK construction has run at between 0% to 5% for a generation – where it hasn’t actually DEFLATED. In fact the figure is remarkably low given the casual and mostly abhorrent nature of the industry and the way the so-called “property market” works.

See http://www.set4women.gov.uk/construction/stats/soi/soireport.htm. Scroll down to figure 11.2 for confirmation. Even if you double the upper figure you still end up with half the alleged percentage, which means the alleged increase would be “only” £15 millions to be divided between four parties at “only” £3.75 millions each.

The only publicly-known major conceptual differences to the stadium were its relocation to the southern end of the site and in the orientation of the sliding pitch. The exit point of the pitch was changed from the width to the length of the arena. This means the structure has to be supported for the length of the pitch, a relatively expensive concept. But still nowhere near enough to add twenty percent to the project.

Furthermore, the alleged additional £30 millions would be spread proportionately between the four consortium members. In equal proportion this would amount to “only” £7.5 millions each, an irritating but not difficult sum to find for such a project. Of course that would require each member to be on top of the job. Unfortunately all evidence points in the other direction.

The main repercussion of the inflated estimate was to launch Kenwright on a fruitless feasibility study of two alternatives which diverged too far from the original stadium/arena design to make them acceptable. Very bad advice again. The whole point of the stadium/arena was for it to be an iconic, state-of-the-art multi purpose venue for community cultural use – a crucial part of the City of Culture 2008 bid, architecture as art in action.

So:

· Which individuals advised Kenwright in this matter and how did he select them?
· Who originated the most recent inflated estimate and how did it reach such a level?
· What specification was used?
· If changed from the original, who changed it and with what authority?
· Why was the site layout not amended so the pitch could still slide out in the short width?
· Why was there no apparent regular interim check on costs as they (allegedly) rose?
· Why did Bovis assure Kenwright they could hold the figure at the original estimate and then change their minds within one month during 2003, presumably on the basis of the same specification and design?
· Who advised Kenwright to develop the two alternative schemes?
· Who benefits (que bono?) if the project is abandoned as a result of this estimate?

The remaining main question on the history of the project is what is the balance sheet of responsibility? The above information and opinions can only point you toward your own research and your own conclusions.

There can be no question our city has lost a glorious, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in the demise of the HOK designed multi-purpose stadium/arena. Whatever eventually goes on the site, however good, will not compare to what might have been. Only sour and perverse minds can extract any satisfaction therefrom. And of course there HAS to be something on the site, if only as part of the City of Culture bid. The original proposal was an essential component of that bid in the first place.

What is important is that there is no scapegoating of Everton Football Club if and when the CoC bid fails. This would be an easy route for all the apparatchiks and politicians who tagged their names to both the bid and the scheme. Some of us will not allow that eventuality to go unchallenged. That includes identifying, naming and shaming the “senior council source” claimed by the local press, which shouldn’t be too difficult.

In fact there is much irony in the project being connected to the City of Culture bid because its demise in many ways is a near perfect expression of England’s contemporary small-minded socio-economic and management culture.

It almost goes without saying the local media have been their usual useless petty selves throughout the whole sorry saga. Had they been alert, had they posed the right questions at the right time, had they regularly prodded all members of the consortium, then our city might still have gained the project. In short, had they performed in the way we are constantly told the Fourth Estate should act in a democratic society then they could have played a valid proportionate role. Their resources and position in the power structure certainly would have got them further and faster than any group of fans could, including ours. As I forecast, the words of the local sports editor have really come home to haunt him. The project was indeed “left to the powers that be.”

The bottom line is the Kings Waterfront was lost because EVERYBODY charged with its delivery couldn’t or didn’t do their job. Like all incompetents, they ended up blaming each other.

Look where it got our city and our club.

8. THE FUTURE.

Where Evertonians are concerned, in the end it boils down to – irrespective of who or what is to blame – what kind of future you foresee for the club in particular and the game in general, what are your hopes, and how you see it all fitting into the city’s regeneration. You cannot divorce one from the other. Those who wish otherwise are whistling in the wind. Football does not exist in a vacuum. It never has and never will. Hence the move to all-seater stadia in the wake of the Taylor Report. Nor can we ignore best practice financial management or administration. Holistic thinking is necessary.

Rightly the club have already said we will move to a new stadium. This is as it should be for a club whose history was based on such a strategy. New stadia have already proved their desirability in virtually every case. For example in Sunderland’s case the move has been nothing less than a spectacular commercial and community success resulting in much larger attendances. It’s time to lift our heads to the future, not stare at our navel and pick fluff.

Quite rightly David Moyes, an instinctively intelligent and open man, has also said he regards this as imperative if the club is to regenerate. One can’t help wondering what he makes of the débacle at Kings Waterfront. A new and better ground is essential for a confident future. If we don’t get it, David Moyes will draw his own conclusions. Guess what they will be.

Much loved as it once was, Goodison Park and its site is now (if only because of the full length Bullens Road wood structure, but actually a lot more reasons) dangerously past its sell-by date. How it continues to obtain a safety certificate is open to query. It is no longer a first rate sporting venue. It is a utility stadium, nothing more. The question for Evertonians now is:

· What location, when, and where is the money to come from?

It doesn’t take much common sense to realise that a stand-alone stadium in any location will cost much more than the once-in-a-lifetime £30 millions share to build at Kings Waterfront. The same question would arise even if it made sense to stay at Goodison, which it doesn’t. Conversely, none of us want to end up with a Pride Park or a Riverside Stadium because that will automatically mean we have abandoned our wish to restore our former stature. Iconic architecture is required, not a flat pack IKEA. This was also the position of Rob Burns of English Heritage when I discussed his opinions of the original concept.

The only way we could even remotely obtain a similar bargain is if there is a similar deal on offer elsewhere in the city. This is unlikely, though I know of at least one development balloon being floated already. But this should be treated warily. All property deals attract Suited and Booted barrow boys out for a quick kill.

In view of the failure of the Kings Waterfront our fans will doubtless look at any other proposal by the board with extreme and justifiable scepticism. The directors can’t say they haven’t earned any cynicism aimed in their direction. Doubtless this will be magnified by a smattering of frustrated odd balls and weirdoes, the kind you’ll find at every football club, the kind I dubbed The Melledrew Tendency, and best ignored.

Nor can the directors now avoid close examination of any company or individuals involved in financing any new proposal. Any such deal should be closely analysed to ensure we avoid a similar mess and to identify the main financial beneficiaries inside and outside Everton Football Club. This is as it should be. There must be no more secrecy on the lines of the Kings Waterfront fiasco. Transparency will be required.

In these circumstances any property carpet-bagger or insider dealer who thinks they can rip off Everton Football Club at another new site is living in cloud-cuckoo land. Believe me, amongst our fans will be at least one or two erstwhile “developers” who reckon they can take advantage. But our genuine fans won’t let it happen. Some of us will watch any future proposal carefully. Make no mistake, economic spivs and cheap barrow boys will gather in droves just as they do at the first sniff of flotation.

The behind-the-scenes rip off that was Pride Park will only happen at Everton if everyone goes to sleep on the job. Cheats will be exposed. Evertonians would be well advised to follow the policy of Ben Bradlee, former editor of the Washington Post, who used to tell his investigative reporters, “Always look for the money and the women.” In this case there are no women, none that we know of anyway. Look for the money, who is lending it, and what profits they are making from it.

Remember, QUE BONO?

As I write, the club have two sites under consideration. One is in Knowsley and the other in south Liverpool. Only time will tell if either is suitable.

Uninformed fans who say spend £30 millions on the team aren’t living in the real world. As has been made clear many times, that money would have been obtained for a property deal only. Like it or not, it just isn’t available for the inflationary madness of the football transfers cattle market. The bubble has long burst. In any case, we have already been down that road with Peter Johnson and Walter Smith and it has left its financial scars for the next generation. Negative player values beckon those clubs who spent not wisely but too well. We will not escape the affects. Nobody will. Ask Leeds United.

Whatever our future it will never replace the magnificence of Kings Waterfront. Nothing can. It was a glorious, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and it was lost. Whatever replaces it – however good, bad or indifferent – will always be compared unconsciously to the brilliance of what-might-have-been.

Those responsible should hang their heads in shame. Lest anyone forget, once again, the list consists of Liverpool Vision, English Partnerships, North West Development Agency, Liverpool City Council, Houston Securities, and, last but not least, Everton Football Club. In each organisation some individuals are more to blame than others.

9. EPILOGUE.

What a pity it all is. What a sorry tale. With the winning post in sight there was a collective loss of nerve and ability. All that’s left is a group of dried-out squawking vultures hunched round-shouldered over a pile of horse bones.

It could all have been so different and so much better for the future of our city and our club. Instead, what we have is a classic English establishment cock-up caused by indeterminate muddle-headed thinking, factionalism, wretched advice, greed, lousy management, jobsworth manipulation and lousy media. Beyond the castle walls was the usual claque of numbskulls and unwashed Bedouin gossiping in tents. Sadly it is an all too familiar story.

For Everton Football Club it is likely that any other project will be nowhere near the quality of the Kings Waterfront design and location. There is no comparable site. Independently we certainly cannot afford the sophistications of the HOK stadium design. A combination of factors now means we will end up inevitably with an inferior solution. That’s what happens when pecksniffery and mere book-keeping prevails over talent.

C’est la vie, c’est la guerre.

Nevertheless, it was all well worth it. Great concepts always are. As the man said, better to have loved and lost than never loved at all. And then you get on with your life without a look back over your shoulder, with only careful regard for the future. Nostalgia won’t pay the rent any more than bleary-eyed sentiment. That is why the Kings Waterfront held such brilliant promise even taking into account its inherent risks. But it has gone now and that’s that.

If its only legacy, its only function, was to open your eyes to what’s possible and how these things work then even that is well worth it. Now you will know how to examine any future proposal. Wherever it is, Ben Bradlee’s advice will still surely apply.

Next.

Let’s get on with it

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